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We analyzed the security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol recently
proposed by Zhang, Li and Man [Phys. Rev. A 71, 044301 (2005)] and found that this protocol is
secure for any other eavesdropper except for the agent Bob who prepares the quantum signals as
he can attack the quantum communication with a Trojan horse. That is, Bob replaces the single-
photon signal with a multi-photon one and the other agent Charlie cannot find this cheating as she
does not measure the photons before they runs back from the boss Alice, which reveals that this
MQSS protocol is not secure for Bob. Finally, we present a possible improvement of the MQSS
protocol security with two single-photon measurements and six unitary operations.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ta, 89.70.+c
In classical secret sharing [1], the boss, say Alice di-
vides her secret message into two pieces and sends them
to her two agents, Bob and Charlie who are at remote
place, respectively, for her business. Bob and Charlie
can reconstruct the secret if and only if they collaborate.
That is MA = MB ⊕MC, here MA, MB and MC are the
messages hold by Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively.
The advantage of secret sharing is that one of the two
agents can keep the other one from doing any damage
when they both appear in the process for the business.
As classical signal is in one of the eigenstates of an op-
erator, say σz , it can be copied freely and fully without
leaving a track. Quantum mechanics provides some novel
ways for message transmitting securely, such as quantum
key distribution [2, 3, 4, 5, 6], quantum secure direct com-
munication [7, 8, 9, 10], quantum dense coding [11, 12],
and so on.
Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is an important branch
of quantum cryptography [2] and it is the generalization
of classical secret sharing into quantum scenario [13, 14].
Since a pioneering QSS scheme was proposed by Hillery,
Buzˇek and Berthiaume in 1999 by using a three-particle
or a four-particle entangled Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) state for sharing a classical information, called
HBB99 customarily for short, there has been a lot of
works focused on QSS in both theoretical [13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27] and experimental
[28, 29] aspects. Almost all the existing QSS protocols
can be attributed to the two types according to their
goals. One is used to distribute a common key among
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some users [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], and
the other is used to split a secret including a classical one
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17] or a quantum one [23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
Recently, Zhang, Li and Man [23] proposed a multi-
party quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol for split-
ting a classical secret message among three parties, say
Alice, Bob and Charlie with single photons following
some ideas from the Ref. [9]. In this paper, we will show
that the Zhang-Li-Man MQSS protocol can be eaves-
dropped by the agent Bob who prepares the quantum sig-
nals with a Trojan horse attack strategy as he can steal
almost all the information encoded by the other agent
Charlie if he replaces the single photon with a multi-
photon quantum signal. As Charlie does not measure
the photons for eavesdropping check before the quantum
signal runs back from the boss Alice, he cannot find this
cheating, which is different in essence to the quantum se-
cure direct communication protocol [9] and the quantum
key distribution protocol with the practical faint laser
pulses [4]. Moreover, we present a possible improvement
of the Zhang-Li-Man MQSS protocol security with two
single-photon measurements and four unitary operations.
Let us start with the brief description of the Zhang-Li-
Man MQSS protocol [23]. We discuss the simple case
in which there are three parties, the Boss Alice, two
agents, Bob and Charlie, shown in Fig.1. The princi-
ple for other case is the same as this simple one with
just a little modification or not. In the Zhang-Li-Man
MQSS protocol [23] the agent Bob prepares a batch of
N single photons with choosing one of the two mea-
suring bases (MBs), namely, the rectilinear basis, σz ,
i.e., |H〉 = |0〉, |V 〉 = |1〉 and the diagonal basis, σx, i.e.,
|u〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |d〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) randomly , simi-
lar to the Ref. [9]. Bob sends the single photons to
Charlie, and Charlie first takes one of the three unitary
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic demonstration of the
Zhang-Li-Man multi-party quantum secret sharing protocol
[23] in the simple case. The two Charlie are the same agent
in two different stages.
operations I, U,H on each photon randomly and then
sends them to Alice. Here I is the identity operation,
U = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| whose nice feature is that it
flips the state in both measuring bases [4, 9, 23], and
H = 1√
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈1|) is the Hadamard
operation which can realize the transformation between
the two MBs [23]. Charlie’s operations are equal to the
encryptions on the states of the single photons. After
receiving the single photons, Alice stores most of them
and picks out a subset of the photons as the samples for
eavesdropping check. For each sample, Alice requires Bob
publish the initial state first and then Charlie tell her the
encrypting operation, or vice versa. She performs single-
photon measurements on the samples by choosing one of
the two measuring bases σz and σx according to the in-
formation published by Bob and Charlie, and analyzes
the security of the transmission of the photons between
Bob and Alice. If the error rate is lower than the thresh-
old, Alice performs the identity operation I on the state
of the single photon if she want to encode a bit 0, other-
wise she performs the operation U on the photon. Alice
sends the single photons to Charlie, and Charlie will read
out the message with the help of Bob’s. That is, Bob tell
Charlie the initial states of the photons, and then gets
the operations done by Alice.
As pointed out in the Refs. [13, 14], if the dishonest one
in the agents in an MQSS cannot eavesdrop the quantum
communication without disturbing the quantum system,
any eavesdropper can be found out if he wants to steal the
information. In this way, the main goal for the security
of an MQSS is simplified to prevent the dishonest agent
from eavesdropping the information. The Zhang-Li-Man
MQSS protocol is secure if the eavesdropper is Charlie or
not the two agents as the eavesdropping will disturb the
quantum system and leave a trick in the results of the
measurements on the sample photons before the message
is encoded on the other photons . Moreover, the parties
can perform a quantum privacy amplification [10] on the
batch of the polarized single photons for improving its
security in a noise channel, similar to that in the Ref.
[9, 10]. However the Zhang-Li-Man MQSS protocol is not
secure if the agent Bob who prepares the quantum signal
is the dishonest one as he can eavesdrop the information
freely with Trojan horse attack [2] even though there are
no losses and noise in the quantum channel. We limit
our discussion in this attack below.
For the attack, Bob need only read out the operations
that Charlie encodes on the photons for encrypting their
states, and then he can get the information transmit-
ted by the boss Alice freely. The Trojan horse attack
can be implemented as following: (1) Bob replaces the
single-photon quantum signal with a multi-photon quan-
tum signal, and Charlie cannot find out this cheating
as he does not measure the photons before they runs
back from Alice, which is different in essence to the quan-
tum secure direct communication protocol [9]. (2) Bob
measures the photons with some photon number split-
ters (PNSs: 50/50) and some detectors. As Bob has the
information about the initial states of the photons, he
can read out the operations done by Charlie with a large
probability if there are several photons in each quantum
signal.
detector 1 
detector 2
detector 3
detector 4
PNS PNS
PNS
FIG. 2: (Color online) The measurements with the photon
number splitters (PNS: 50/50) in the case that there are four
photons in each signal.
To present the Trojan horse attack clearly, we use a
four-photon quantum signal as the fake signal with which
Bob eavesdrops Charlie’s operations for the sake of sim-
plicity. Bob prepares the four photons in the same state,
say |H〉 = |0〉 and sends them to Charlie. As Charlie
takes his operation on each signal, the four photons will
be performed a same unitary operation and then there
are four copies of the states encoded by Charlie with the
same unitary operation. Bob uses three PNSs to split the
fake signal and performs σz measurement on each photon,
shown in Fig.2. If Charlie takes the operation I or U , the
outcomes of the measurements on the four photons with
σz are the same one with the probability 100%. On the
contrast, Bob gets the same outcome with the probability
(1
2
)4 = 1
16
if Charlie operates the signal with H operation
as Bob obtains the outcome ”0” or ”1” with the probabil-
ity 50% for each photon in the state |u〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉).
If Charlie performs the operations {I, U,H} on each sig-
nal with the same probability, the probability Pe that
3Charlie cannot determine which operation is chosen by
Charlie on the signal is 1
3
× (1
2
)4 = 1
48
= 2.1%. If Bob re-
places the single-photon signal with an N-photon signal,
then Pe =
1
3
× (1
2
)N . When N = 10, Pe = 3.26 × 10
−4.
Moreover, Bob’s eavesdropping does not introduce errors
in the results of the measurements done by Charlie in
the final process if he just measures N−1 photons in the
multi-photon signal and sends the other one to Alice.
In the Ref. [9], as any eavesdropper does not know
the initial state of the quantum signal and the parties
take measurements on a subset of photons chosen ran-
domly for eavesdropping check of each transmission, the
eavesdropper cannot steal the information with a Trojan
horse attack strategy. In the Zhang-Li-Man MQSS pro-
tocol [23], there are not those two features for the agent
Charlie. So any eavesdropper can get the operations done
by Charlie with a Trojan horse attack strategy, including
the agent Bob. Certainly, this eavesdropping process is
useful just to Bob, not to other eavesdroppers as they
will be detected by the three legitimate parties if they
want to steal the information about the operations done
by Alice or the initial states prepared by Bob.
For improving the security of the Zhang-Li-ManMQSS
protocol [23], the three parties must have the capability
to hold back an eavesdropper to attack the quantum com-
munication with a Trojan horse. This MQSS protocol is
secure if Charlie and Alice can forbid Bob to eavesdrop
the quantum line. Charlie must have the ability to dis-
tinguish whether each quantum signal is a single-photon
one or a multi-photon one before he encrypts the signals
with the unitary operations. For this end, Charlie can
store the quantum signals and chooses randomly a sub-
set of the quantum signals, similar to Alice. He splits
the sample signals with a photon number splitter (PNS),
similar to the Trojan horse attack done by Bob (see Fig.
2) and then measures the two signals with the measuring
bases σz and σx randomly. Just this modification, Char-
lie can prevent Bob from eavesdropping without being
detected as both the measurements will have an outcome
if the quantum signal is a multi-photon one. Charlie uses
the probability Pm that there are many photons in each
quantum signal sent by Bob to determine whether Bob
is honest. If the Pm is very low, Bob is a honest one.
Certainly, Charlie can improve the security with three or
more PNSs largely, same as that in Fig.2.
For the symmetry, Charlie can exploit the fourth uni-
tary operation H = 1√
2
(|0〉〈0|−|1〉〈0|−|0〉〈1|−|1〉〈1|) for
the encryption. That is, Charlie chooses randomly one of
the four unitary operations {I, U,H,H} to encrypt the
state of each photon, which will reduce the probability
that Bob obtains the information about the operations
done by Charlie with Trojan horse attack in particular
in the case with a noise quantum channel. That is, the
probability that Bob distinguishes the operations {I, U}
from the operations {H,H} will decrease.
For the integrity, let us describe the modified Zhang-
Li-Man MQSS protocol as follows in brief.
(a) The agent Bob prepares a batch of N single pho-
tons S randomly in one of the four polarization states
{|H〉, |V 〉, |u〉, |d〉} randomly , similar to the Ref. [9]. He
sends S to the agent Charlie.
(b) After receiving S, Charlie chooses a sufficiently
large subset of photons in S, and splits each signal with
a PNS. He measures the two signals after the PNS with
choosing one of the two MBs σz and σx randomly.
(c) Charlie requires Bob to tell him the information
about the original states of the sample photons, and he
analyzes the probability Pm that there are many photons
in each quantum signal sent by Bob. Also he analyzes the
error rate ǫr of the sample photons.
(d) If Pm is very low and ǫr is lower than the thresh-
old, Charlie encrypts almost all the remained photons in
S with choosing randomly one of the four unitary oper-
ations {I, U,H,H}. Also, he chooses some samples , say
SC from the S sequence, and performs them with one
of the two operations {σx, σz} randomly, and continues
to the next step. Otherwise he discards the results and
repeats the quantum communication from the beginning.
The unitary operations done by Charlie is equivalent
to the uniform encryption on the photons. In a noise
channel, the error correction and the privacy amplifi-
cation techniques should be used on those photons for
improving the security, same as those in the Ref. [7].
The quantum error correction technique is not difficult
in principle to be implemented, and a quantum privacy
amplification way for the single photons was proposed
also [10]. Hence, the quantum communication between
Bob and Charlie can be made secure.
(e) Charlie sends the remained photons, say S′ to Al-
ice. Alice stores most of the single photons and picks out
randomly a sufficiently large subset of single photons for
eavesdropping check. She tell Bob and Charlie the po-
sitions of the sample photons. She requires Bob tell her
the original states of the sample photons first, and then
Charlie tell her the operations encoded, or vice versa. For
the samples done by Charlie with the operations σx and
σz, Charlie tell Alice the positions first and then Alice re-
quires Bob tell her their original states. Charlie publishes
the operations for the samples SC .
(f) Alice measures each of the sample photons with a
correlated MB, and determines whether there is an eaves-
dropper monitoring the quantum line between Bob and
Alice, see Fig.1.
(g) If there is no eavesdropper, Alice encodes the pho-
tons in S′ except for those chosen for eavesdropping check
(namely, S′′), with the two unitary operations I and U
which are coded as the bits 0 and 1, respectively. Surely,
Alice should select some photons from S′′ as the samples
for eavesdropping check and operate them with I and U
randomly, same as [7, 9]. Alice sends S′′ to Charlie.
(h) Charlie reads out the secret message with the help
of Bob’s. That is, Bob tell Charlie the original state
for each photon, and then Charlie measures each pho-
ton with a correlated MB. Of course, they should check
the eavesdropping of the transmission between Alice to
Charlie before Bob and Charlie cooperate to read out the
4message.
The modified Zhang-Li-Man MQSS protocol is in
essence equivalent to the quantum secure direct commu-
nication protocol [9] with quantum privacy amplification
[10]. So it is secure. Moreover, it is not difficult to gener-
alize this protocol to the case withN agents by modifying
the original Zhang-Li-Man MQSS protocol [23] with the
methods discussed above.
In summary, we analyzed the security of the MQSS
protocol proposed by Zhang, Li and Man [23] and found
that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper
except for the agent Bob who prepares the quantum sig-
nal as he can attack the quantum communication with a
Trojan horse, i.e., he replaces the original signal with a
multi-photon signal and measures them with some PNSs.
Bob’s eavesdropping cannot be detected. Finally, we
present a possible improvement of the MQSS protocol se-
curity with two single-photon measurements and six uni-
tary operations. With those modifications, the Zhang-Li-
Man MQSS protocol is secure not only for distributing
a common key among the users in MQSS but also for
splitting a secret message, same as the quantum secure
direct communication protocol [9] with the quantum pri-
vacy amplification [10].
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Addendum- For improving the security of the Zhang-
Man-Li MQSS protocol completely, the parties of the
communication should have the capability of prevent the
agents from eavesdropping. The eavesdropping done by
Charlie who does not know the original states of the
photons prepared by Bob can be detected in the sim-
ple way that Alice requires Charlie tell her the opera-
tions first and then Bob publish the original states of the
samples chosen randomly. For forbidding Bob eavesdrop,
the best way may be that Charlie adds some decoy pho-
tons which are prepared by Charlie and randomly in the
states |0〉, |1〉, |u〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |d〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), in
the sequence S. In this way, Charlie should have an ideal
single-photon source.
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